Sunday, 22 March 2026

India’s New Buyback Tax Rules from Apr2026: What It Means for You

India’s New Buyback Tax Rules from Apr2026: What It Means for You 22Mar2026

 

 
 
 

(This is my 501st blog since 2010. Over the years, I have covered global financial markets, with a focus on India, and continue to share insights to help readers understand complex topics in simple language.

The views expressed here are for information purposes only and should not be construed as a recommendation or investment advice. While the author is a CFA Charterholder with nearly 25 years of experience in financial markets, this content is intended to share general insights and does not constitute financial guidance. 

Please consult your financial adviser before taking any investment decision. Safe to assume the author has a vested interest in stocks / investments discussed if any.) 

 

Note to Readers: I’m not a tax expert—just a normal person trying to understand the recent changes in how equity buybacks are taxed in India. This post is just for information on the topic, and not meant to be financial or legal advice.

I am writing this blog because India’s tax rules for share buybacks have changed multiple times in less than two years, creating confusion for investors. 
 
With the new buyback tax regime coming into effect from 01Apr2026, it is important to understand how it affects retail / individual investors, promoters and company behaviour. 

This guide explains the past, the present and what to expect going forward.
 
 
1 The two old tax regimes under two years

The taxation of share buybacks in India changed twice in less than two years, which caused confusion for investors.

A. Rules before 01Oct2024:

Before 01Oct2024, when a listed company bought back its own shares, it had to pay a special Buyback Distribution Tax (BDT).
 
The effective rate was 23.296 per cent (20 per cent tax plus surcharge and cess) on the gain, which is the difference between the buyback price and the original issue price of the shares.

Shareholders did not have to pay any tax on the buyback proceeds. If you were a retail / individual investor, the money you received from the company was tax-free.

B. Rules from 01Oct2024 to 31Mar2026:

From 01Oct2024, the government removed the company-level buyback tax. However, shareholders were now taxed on the entire buyback proceeds as "deemed dividends." The income was treated as part of "Income from Other Sources" and taxed according to the individual income tax slab.

Companies also had to deduct TDS (tax deduction at source) when paying shareholders. The rate was 10 per cent for residents and 20 per cent for non-residents, subject to double taxation treaty relief.

The cost of acquisition of the shares could not be deducted from the buyback proceeds. It could only be treated as a capital loss to offset other capital gains and carried forward for up to eight years.

As a result, investors in higher tax slabs could pay more tax than under the earlier BDT system because the full buyback amount was taxed, not just the gain.

Why this period was confusing:

These two regimes in quick succession, first a company-level tax and then a high-tax deemed dividend, created uncertainty. Retail investors did not know in advance how much tax they would have to pay, and companies had to adjust their buyback plans frequently.
 

(article continues below)

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Related blogs:

A Layperson's Look at India's Complicated Tax Rules on Share Buybacks 16Sep2025

Negative Impact of Debt Mutual Fund Tax Changes (including taxation of equity mutual funds also) 25Mar2023 

 

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2 The new tax regime from Apr2026

From 01Apr2026, share buybacks in India will be taxed as capital gains. This means tax is applied only on the actual profit, which is the difference between the buyback price and the cost of acquisition, instead of the full amount received.

This brings buyback taxation in line with the normal sale of shares in the market and removes the earlier issue where the entire amount was taxed as deemed dividend.

Retail / individual investors, typically those holding less than 10 per cent of a company’s total equity shares, will be taxed at standard capital gains rates. 

Short-term gains (holding period of up to 12 months) are taxed at 20 per cent, while long-term gains (more than 12 months) are taxed at 12.5 per cent. In addition, a surcharge as applicable and a four per cent cess will be charged on the capital gains tax, whether short term or long term. 

The Rs 1.25 lakh exemption for long-term capital gains continues to apply, and now extends to gains arising from buybacks as well.

Promoters are taxed differently. Individual promoters face an effective buyback tax of 30 per cent, while corporate promoters face 22 per cent, ensuring they do not benefit from lower capital gains rates.

Overall, the new regime restores the earlier system of taxing buybacks for retail shareholders that existed prior to 01Oct2024. However, corporate promoters and individual promoters will, from 01Apr2026, pay higher buyback tax rates compared to the period before 01Oct2024.


3 Impact on promoters:

From 01Apr2026, promoters face higher taxes on gains from buybacks compared to retail shareholders. Individual promoters are subject to an effective buyback tax of 30 per cent, while corporate promoters face 22 per cent.

An individual promoter includes persons or entities, such as Hindu Undivided Families (HUFs), that hold 10 per cent or more of a company’s total shares, directly or indirectly. 

A corporate promoter is a company or corporate entity that holds 10 per cent or more of the shares. This distinction matters because the tax rates differ for individual promoters and corporate promoters.

The government’s pitch is that it wants to maintain tax neutrality between different ways of distributing profits. Under the old system, promoters could sometimes benefit from lower taxes compared to dividends. 

The new regime closes that loophole and aligns promoter taxation with their control and ability to influence company decisions.

In companies where promoters hold less than 10 per cent, or there are zero promoters, there is no special promoter tax. All shareholders, including retail and institutional investors, pay only the standard capital gains tax on actual gains, along with applicable surcharge and 4 per cent cess.

This change is expected to influence promoter behaviour. High-tax rates for promoters may reduce their incentive to push for buybacks purely for personal tax benefit. 

Instead, they may choose dividends, reinvestment in business or other strategic uses of profits, depending on company priorities and market conditions.

A listed company's promoters may consist of individuals, HUFs, corporate entities or other. So, depending on the type of promoter, new buyback tax rules will be applicable effective 01Apr2026.

4 Shift in corporate behaviour: 

The new buyback tax rules effective 01Apr2026 are expected to influence how companies manage their profits and deploy cash.

Companies with a high retail shareholder base may find buybacks attractive again. Retail investors now pay tax only on the actual gains, at 12.5 per cent for long-term holdings, instead of higher slab rates on the full proceeds. 

This makes buybacks an efficient way to return cash and support stock prices, and we may see a revival in announcements from companies that rely on retail investor support.

Dividends remain a neutral option for companies with high promoter holdings. Since promoters now face an effective buyback tax of 22 to 30 per cent, there is no longer a strong tax incentive to choose buybacks over dividends. 

Large-cap companies may continue to pay steady dividends to meet the expectations of institutional investors who prefer consistent cash flow.

The new buyback taxation is also likely to affect decisions on capital expenditure and cash deployment. Companies that had previously hoarded cash while waiting for favourable tax rules may now be more willing to invest in growth or return cash to shareholders. 

Firms in sectors such as infrastructure, green energy, semiconductors and logistics may prioritise capex to capture long-term growth opportunities.

For companies with zero promoter holdings, the incentive to conduct buybacks may be limited. Without promoters benefiting directly, buybacks may be undertaken primarily for market support or shareholder returns rather than promoter interest. Examples of such firms, include, Coforge Ltd, L&T, Care Ratings and Redington Ltd.

As documented earlier, only seven companies of the 42 listed companies with zero promoter holdings as of data of 2025 had undertaken buybacks, one time or more, in the past five or six years. 

Historically, only a few companies have done buybacks without promoter participation, such as Jagran Prakashan. Banks in India rarely undertake buybacks.

Based on past trends and new taxation rules, some companies that may announce share buybacks after 01Apr2026 include: 

Ajanta Pharma,

Balrampur Chini Mills, 

BSE Ltd, 

eClerx Services, 

Infosys, 

SIS Ltd,

Tanla Platforms, and 

TCS Ltd.

Of course, this assumes that these companies continue to generate profits in the future and are willing to distribute them to shareholders. Investors should not take this as a guarantee of a buyback.
 
It seems some companies, rain or shine, have been consistently doing buybacks despite frequent and capricious changes in taxation rules. 
 
Notable examples include eClerx Services, Infosys, SIS Ltd and Tanla Platforms. This suggests that for such firms, buybacks are a regular part of their capital allocation strategy, rather than being triggered solely by tax considerations. 

Investors should note that frequent changes in buyback taxation have historically distorted corporate behaviour, so past patterns may not always predict future actions.
 

Table showing companies that have undertaken buybacks frequently in the past five / six years (this is only a representative list used for illustration purposes and should not be construed as investment advice):

Please click on the table to view better >

 


 

5 Caution for investors: 

Buybacks are not always aimed at benefiting all shareholders. From experience, they are often influenced by promoter interests and announced when taxation favours promoters.

Promoters sometimes go ahead with buybacks at high valuations, mainly benefiting exiting shareholders. Studying promoter participation and intentions is important, as promoters may choose not to participate even when eligible.

Some companies, like eClerx Services, Infosys, SIS Ltd and Tanla Platforms, have consistently done buybacks despite frequent tax changes, suggesting it can be a regular capital allocation strategy.

Investors should not rely solely on buyback likelihood. Company fundamentals, sector outlook and economic conditions remain key factors. Past patterns provide context but do not ensure future outcomes.

(the blog is yet to be completed, shall complete the same in the next one or two hours. please bear me with till then) 


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References:

dd  

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Read more:

Blog of Blogs Theme-wise 
 
Weblinks and Investing
 
India Fixed Income Data Bank
 
Indian Economy Data Bank 

India Forex Data Bank 
 
Who is Eating my Gold ETF Return? (gold data / gold ETF data)
 
JP Morgan Guide to Markets 28Feb2025  
 
Corporate Groups and Listed Companies 29Dec2024
 
Corporate Governance Concerns - Indian Companies 13Dec2024
 
Stocks and Peer Comparison by Industry 16Feb2024  
 
various uploads on Scribd by VRK100  
 
 
 
Banks Bet on Loans, Not Bonds — Credit Surges to a Record High 04Mar2026  
 
From Farms to Factories to Services: India’s GDP Explained via Production Approach 22Feb2026  
Understanding India’s GDP – A Simple Guide to the Expenditure Approach 18Feb2026 
 
India’s REIT Market: Institutional Scale, Retail Opportunity 17Feb2026 
 
Is GST Growth Now Tracking Nominal GDP?  15Feb2026
 
Why Food Matters Less in India’s New CPI and What It Means for RBI  30Jan2026
 
Top 10 Equity Indices Powering Passive Investing in India: Big-Picture View  29Jan2026
 
Canada's Mark Carney at Davos: Middle Powers Must Step Up 28Jan2026
 
Nifty IT Underperformance Explained – Nasdaq Outshines Indian IT in 2025  26Jan2026
 
Inside the BSE 500 and S&P 500: Top Stocks, Top Sectors, Big Risks 31Dec2025  
 
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Disclosure:  I've got a vested interest in Indian stocks and other investments. It's safe to assume I've interest in the financial instruments / products discussed, if any.
 
Disclaimer: The analysis and opinion provided here are only for information purposes and should not be construed as investment advice. Investors should consult their own financial advisers before making any investments. The author is a CFA Charterholder with a vested interest in financial markets.

------------------------ 

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CFA Charter credentials  - CFA Member Profile

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CFA Badge  

 

Viewing Options for this blog in different formats:

Sidebar and so on

 

He blogs at:

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Wednesday, 4 March 2026

Banks Bet on Loans, Not Bonds — Credit Surges to a Record High 04Mar2026

Banks Bet on Loans, Not Bonds — Credit Surges to a Record High 04Mar2026

 

 
 
 

(This is my 500th blog since 2010. Over the years, I have covered global financial markets, with a focus on India, and continue to share insights to help readers understand complex topics in simple language.

The views expressed here are for information purposes only and should not be construed as a recommendation or investment advice. While the author is a CFA Charterholder with nearly 25 years of experience in financial markets, this content is intended to share general insights and does not constitute financial guidance. 

Please consult your financial adviser before taking any investment decision. Safe to assume the author has a vested interest in stocks / investments discussed if any.) 

 

India’s banks are in the middle of a lending surge. Between Mar2025 and Dec2025, scheduled commercial banks expanded gross credit by Rs 20.8 lakh crore, including a striking Rs 12.5 lakh crore jump in the Oct-Dec2025 quarter alone. 

Deposits grew strongly too, but instead of channeling fresh funds into government bonds, banks deployed almost all of it into loans, pushing the credit-to-deposit ratio to a record high.

This shift matters. When banks choose loans over bonds, it reshapes liquidity conditions, influences bond yields and signals where economic momentum truly lies. 

The latest data suggest that the current cycle is being powered less by large industrial borrowing and more by retail and services credit — a consumption-led expansion that is quietly redefining the balance sheets of India’s banking system.

 

1. Credit Over Bonds:

The shift is clear in the numbers. 

SCBs in India  Agg Deposits  Investments Credit change in agg dep change in inv change in credit
  Rs lakh crore
             
Dec.2025 248.57 68.84 203.21 10.75 0.29 12.47
Sep.2025 237.83 68.56 190.73 3.57 1.59 5.87
Jun.2025 234.26 66.96 184.86 8.45 -0.01 2.42
Mar.2025 225.81 66.97 182.44 NA NA NA
             
Change in 3 quarters (b/w Mar2025 & Dec2025) 22.77 1.87 20.77
 

Between Mar2025 and Dec2025, banks overwhelmingly prioritised lending over government securities. Aggregate deposits rose by Rs 22.8 lakh crore in this period, of which Rs 20.8 lakh crore was deployed into loans (over 90 per cenet of increase in deposits), while only Rs 1.9 lakh crore went into government securities. 

This pushed the Credit Deposit Ratio (CDR) to a record 81.7 per cent by Dec2025, while the Investment Deposit Ratio (IDR) slightly declined to 27.7 per cent, indicating that banks were holding a smaller share of deposits in investments (government securities).

After a brief liquidity bulge in Jun2025, banks quickly redeployed funds, pushing the credit-to-deposit ratio above 81 per cent and keeping bond holdings near regulatory comfort levels.

Between Mar2025 and Dec2025, the 10-year government bond (G Sec) yield in India moved in a narrow range, starting at 6.59 per cent at the end of Mar2025, dropping to 6.25 per cent in May2025, and returning to 6.59 per cent by the end of Dec2025. 

The brief dip in May offered a small window of lower borrowing costs, but for most of the period, yields remained elevated compared with previous months. 

Higher yields made fresh bond purchases attractive in theory, but banks faced the risk of mark-to-market losses on older holdings and had seemingly more lucrative opportunities in lending. 

This partly explains why banks largely kept their bond portfolios stable while aggressively deploying deposits into credit.

The result is a banking system that has maximised the deployment of deposits into loans, reflecting strong credit demand and the relative attractiveness of lending in a post-pandemic economy. 

The surge in lending, particularly to households and the services sector, underscores why credit growth has outpaced deposit growth, while bond holdings have stayed close to regulatory minimums.


2. Retail and Services Lead the Way:

Between March and December 2025, the incremental deployment of bank credit was broad-based but clearly tilted toward consumption and services.

Personal loans accounted for the largest share of new lending, rising by Rs 6.77 lakh crore and contributing about 32.5 percent of the total increase. This includes housing, vehicle loans, gold loans and other retail credit, underscoring the strength of household borrowing.

Services was the second-largest contributor, with credit expanding by Rs 5.61 lakh crore, or 27 percent of the total increase. This category spans NBFCs, trade, real estate, tourism and professional services, suggesting that much of the momentum is flowing through service-oriented and intermediary sectors.

Agriculture and MSME each saw credit growth of Rs 2.22 lakh crore, accounting for about 10.7 percent each of the incremental lending. This indicates steady expansion in priority and small-business segments.

Large industry saw a relatively modest rise of Rs 1.47 lakh crore, just 7.1 percent of the total increase, highlighting that the current credit upswing is not being driven primarily by big-ticket corporate borrowing. 

Deployment of Gross Bank Credit by Sectors >

Sector change share in
    change
Rupees in lakh crore    
Bank credit (total) 20.79 100.0%
     
Major sector    
Personal loans# 6.77 32.5%
Services* 5.61 27.0%
Agriculture 2.22 10.7%
MSME 2.22 10.7%
Large industry 1.47 7.1%
total 18.28 87.9%
 

# personal loans incl loans against jewellery, housing, vehicle loans, etc.

* Services include NBFCs, trade, real estate, prof services, tourism, etc. 

Data source: RBI Monthly Bulletin - Deployment of Gross Bank Credit by Major Sectors

  

3. Key Ratios of Banking Industry

Chart showing key ratios for Scheduled Commercial Banks (SCBs) in India over recent quarters and fiscal years (FY 2013-14 till now), showing how banks balance their investments, lending and liquidity requirements >

Data source:

RBI Monthly Bulletin - Select Economic Indicators (data of IDR and CDR from Mar2024 include impact of merger of HDFC Ltd with HDFC Bank Ltd in Jul2023)

 

 

What the above chart reveals:

The above table presents key ratios for Scheduled Commercial Banks (SCBs) in India over recent quarters and fiscal years, showing how banks manage the balance between lending, investment and regulatory liquidity requirements.

The Investment Deposit Ratio (IDR) and Credit Deposit Ratio (CDR) together indicate how banks allocate funds between investing in government securities and lending to borrowers. 

A review of the data reveals clear trends over the past decade. IDR and CDR were relatively low in Mar2019, at a time when SLR and CRR were slightly higher, reflecting tighter liquidity requirements that limited lending. 

Over subsequent years, as SLR and CRR gradually declined, banks gained more flexibility, enabling both IDR and CDR to rise steadily. 

There was a sharp dip during the COVID-19 period, when credit growth slowed amid economic uncertainty, but the trend reversed strongly in the post-pandemic years.

In the past two to three years, this shift has accelerated. The CDR has climbed from 72.2 per cent in Mar2022 to 81.7 per cent by Dec2025, indicating that credit growth is consistently outstripping deposit growth. 

At the same time, the IDR has slightly declined from 28.7 per cent to 27.7 per cent, showing that banks are holding a smaller share of deposits in investments. 

CRR has also fallen from 4.0 per cent in Jun2025 to 3.0 per cent in Dec2025, freeing up liquidity for lending, while SLR has remained stable at 18 per cent, allowing banks to maintain regulatory buffers without expanding bond holdings.

Overall, the table tells the story of a banking system increasingly favoring loans over bonds. 

With lower CRR and SLR, banks are able to maximise lending, particularly to households and services, while keeping investment in government securities closer to the regulatory minimum. 

This reflects both stronger credit demand and a structural shift in how Indian banks deploy their deposits.

Definitions:

Investment Deposit Ratio (IDR) is the percentage of total deposits that banks invest in government securities.

Credit Deposit Ratio (CDR) is the percentage of total deposits that banks have lent out as loans to borrowers.

Statutory Liquidity Ratio (SLR) is the minimum percentage of deposits that banks must maintain in liquid assets like government bonds.

Cash Reserve Ratio (CRR) is the portion of deposits banks are required to keep as cash reserves with the Reserve Bank of India, which cannot be used for lending or investment. Banks earn zero interest on this.

How do Regulatory Ratios Impacted Bank Lending and Investing Over the Decade

Between Mar2014 and Dec2025, regulatory requirements eased significantly, with CRR plus SLR falling from 27 per cent to 21 per cent. 

Despite this, the Investment Deposit Ratio declined by only about one percentage point, as banks continued to hold a sizeable portion of deposits in government securities for liquidity and risk management. 

At the same time, the Credit-to-Deposit Ratio rose nearly 4 percentage points, showing that banks increasingly prioritised lending over bonds, supported by strong credit demand. Regulatory relief alone does not automatically boost lending—banks balance liquidity risk and returns when deploying funds. 

The merger of HDFC Ltd with HDFC Bank in Jul2023 may have slightly affected IDR and CDR post-merger, as the combined balance sheets changed the composition of deposits, loans and investments.

Since 2014, the RBI has slowly 'unlocked' the vault by lowering SLR and CRR. Banks didn't use that extra freedom to buy more bonds; they used every bit of it to fund the lending boom. 

 

4. Concluding Remarks

With the credit-to-deposit ratio now above 81 per cent, banks have effectively maximised the deployment of deposits into loans, while keeping bond holdings close to regulatory minimums. 

This has implications for bond market liquidity and short-term yields and could influence government borrowing costs. Looking ahead, banks may take a breather in lending over the next two quarters unless deposit growth or credit demand picks up. 

The pace and composition of future lending will depend on household and services demand, corporate borrowing needs and broader liquidity conditions, including bond yields and regulatory ratios.

I wrote this blog to demystify how Indian banks manage their funds, showing how regulatory ratios, credit growth and bond market dynamics influence the balance between lending and investing—areas that can seem complex to many investors.

All data and analysis in this blog are based on publicly available sources and the author’s interpretation; and do not constitute financial advice.


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References:

Bloomberg article 26Feb2026 Indian Banks Snap Up Bonds as Holdings Approach Regulatory Floor

For the past 20 years, RBI has not been paying any interest to CRR to banks.  

------------------- 

Read more:

Blog of Blogs Theme-wise 
 
Weblinks and Investing
 
India Fixed Income Data Bank
 
Indian Economy Data Bank 

India Forex Data Bank 
 
Who is Eating my Gold ETF Return? (gold data / gold ETF data)
 
JP Morgan Guide to Markets 28Feb2025  
 
Corporate Groups and Listed Companies 29Dec2024
 
Corporate Governance Concerns - Indian Companies 13Dec2024
 
Stocks and Peer Comparison by Industry 16Feb2024  
 
various uploads on Scribd by VRK100  
 
 
 
From Farms to Factories to Services: India’s GDP Explained via Production Approach 22Feb2026  
Understanding India’s GDP – A Simple Guide to the Expenditure Approach 18Feb2026 
 
India’s REIT Market: Institutional Scale, Retail Opportunity 17Feb2026 
 
Is GST Growth Now Tracking Nominal GDP?  15Feb2026
 
Why Food Matters Less in India’s New CPI and What It Means for RBI  30Jan2026
 
Top 10 Equity Indices Powering Passive Investing in India: Big-Picture View  29Jan2026
 
Canada's Mark Carney at Davos: Middle Powers Must Step Up 28Jan2026
 
Nifty IT Underperformance Explained – Nasdaq Outshines Indian IT in 2025  26Jan2026
 
Inside the BSE 500 and S&P 500: Top Stocks, Top Sectors, Big Risks 31Dec2025  
 
-------------------
 
Disclosure:  I've got a vested interest in Indian stocks and other investments. It's safe to assume I've interest in the financial instruments / products discussed, if any.
 
Disclaimer: The analysis and opinion provided here are only for information purposes and should not be construed as investment advice. Investors should consult their own financial advisers before making any investments. The author is a CFA Charterholder with a vested interest in financial markets.

------------------------ 

CFA 10 Year Milestone Professional Learning Program 2025 Certificate of Achievement 



 

CFA Charter credentials  - CFA Member Profile

CFA New Badge 

CFA Badge  

 

Viewing Options for this blog in different formats:

Sidebar and so on

 

He blogs at:

https://ramakrishnavadlamudi.blogspot.com/

https://www.scribd.com/vrk100

X (Twitter) @vrk100